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Sara Copic

The Content of Consciousness:
Do We Need Qualia?
		 Philosophy is the practice of coming
to understand that with which we believe
we are most intimately familiar – our
social norms, the golden rule, learning,
our consciousness (to name just a few). Of course, there is
a sense in which we are all familiar with and understand
consciousness: we experience it in our normal waking life. To
borrow from Thomas Nagel, each of us knows “what it is like”
to experience the world from a certain point of view. However,
experience of, does not necessarily yield insight into, and it is
perhaps our very familiarity with consciousness that deludes us
into believing we comprehend it. When we begin to question
this phenomenon, the very thing that defines who we are, we
uncover that we hardly know our own minds.
Therefore, it is not surprising that, “The greatest chasm
in the philosophy of mind – maybe even all of philosophy
– divides two perspectives on consciousness.” The point of
contention revolves around the existence of qualia, or intrinsic
qualities of our experience, and our purported awareness of
them. In other words, the question, “Is there anything in
phenomenal consciousness that escapes or goes beyond the
intentional, cognitive, and functional?” has spurred great
debate in recent times, and brought about two main theories
to answer the question.
These competing views are called intentionalism (or
representationism) and phenomenism. Intentionalists claim
that phenomenal conscious experiences, such as seeing
red or feeling pain, are nothing more than intentional or
representational mental contents. (There is a debate about the
nature of this content, that is, whether it is “narrow” or “wide”
content, a point which lies outside our scope.) In contrast,
phenomenists argue that qualia (which, by definition, escape
intentional, cognitive, and functional characterization) are
real, and that we have first-person access to them. According
to phenomenism, we can attend to and be aware of the vehicle
of representation of our experiences, as well as of phenomenal
characters that are intrinsic but do not represent anything.
This paper will explore the chasm between intentionalism
and phenomenism, and ultimately attempt a defense of the
former.
First, let us develop a framework for our approach
to consciousness, which is relatively uncontroversial in
contemporary philosophy of mind. All of the topics discussed
here will accord with physicalism, the idea that our universe
only contains matter (atoms and their subparticles, bosons,
and the like) and energy (fermions, light, etc.). Under the
physicalist doctrine, all phenomena (including mental

phenomena) must be accounted for without invoking other
kinds of substances. Thus, while substance dualism (the idea
that there are physical and mental substances which have
different and mutually exclusive properties) is out, property
dualism is still in the game. Hence, both an intentionalist and a
phenomenist could be property dualists, holding the view that
mental properties (thoughts, beliefs, phenomenal experience)
are fundamentally irreducible to their physical realizers (Heil
177). Since qualia preclude functional, cognitive, or intentional
characterization, they must, if they exist, supervene on these
mental properties. If qualia are real, supervenience would be
true and intentionalism false (Block).
Secondly, the philosophical debate over the putative
existence of qualia and their first person accessibility is a parcel
of a greater debate about a paradigm of the mental called
functionalism. In functionalism, mental states are part of
a causal network. For instance, if you stub your big toe on
your bed post, you are most likely, under normal conditions,
going to experience pain. According to functionalism, this
pain state was caused by your tissue damage, and in turn
causes pain behavior and avoidance behavior (perhaps you
wince, rub your toe, and watch out for furniture in your
path in the future). Here, pain acts as a causal intermediary
between tissue damage and pain behavior (Kim). The qualia
debate factors into this because philosophers want to know
if our phenomenal experience, “what it is like” for a subject
to experience something, can be characterized functionally. If
not, functionalism would prove to be an incomplete picture of
the mind’s workings. Here, we will focus more specifically on
the qualia debate, though issues about functionalism will be
embedded within the discussion.
Several questions accompany the issues noted above.
Are there such properties as qualia? If so, do we have firstperson access to them, and how can we become aware of
them? Why would qualia accompany or supervene on our
conscious experiences (in a way, this question poses Chalmers’
“hard problem” in different terms)? What are the appeals of
intentionalism versus phenomenism, or vice versa? How does
each theory account for our phenomenal experience? What is the
relationship between phenomenism and epiphenomenalism2?
Finally, if qualia exist, do they present a serious challenge for
functionalism? Here, the exploration of these issues will be
guided by the views of Gilbert Harman and Ned Block, who
represent intentionalism and phenomenism, respectively.
There are three main arguments for qualia that Block
and Harman both discuss. The most famous of these is the
inverted spectrum argument, which we will explore last. Let
us turn to the argument from awareness of qualia during
experience. This argument takes the following form: When
one experiences redness or pain, one is aware of an intrinsic
quality of one’s experience, where “an intrinsic quality is a
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quality something has in itself, apart from its relation to other
things,” (Harman 664). An intrinsic quality of a subject’s
experience (or a quale) cannot be characterized functionally,
since functionalism defines mental events in terms of their
relations to each other, to their physical causes, and to behavior.
Therefore, functionalism does not offer a complete picture of
our (conscious) mental activity (Harman).
How might an intentionalist respond to this argument?
Gilbert Harman responds by calling the premise into
question. In fact, Harman claims that we cannot be aware of
the intrinsic qualities of our experiences except in special cases
that do not pose a problem for functionalism; for instance,
you may be able to become aware of the intrinsic qualities
of your experiences by observing your own brain in a mirror
during a surgery (Harman), but this kind of access to the
intrinsic qualities of your experience occurs from the third
person perspective, and thus is not the same kind of access
that phenomenists are talking about. It is important to note
that access to our qualia, if they exist as defined above, is only a
challenge for functionalism if it is first person access3. Harman
claims that we can only be aware of our intentional mental
content, meaning the objects that are represented and not the
medium which represents them, although it can be easy to
confuse the intrinsic quality of the represented object of our
experience with the intrinsic quality of the experience itself
(Harman). According to Harman, the premise of the argument
from awareness falls prey to this confusion.
Harman invokes a very clear example to support his case.
He writes that if you have a pain in your leg, “It is very tempting
to confuse features of what you experience as happening in
your leg with the intrinsic features of your experience. But
the happening in your leg that you are presented with is the
intentional object of your experience; it is not the experience
itself ” (668).
Harman invokes a useful analogy to showcase this point
further. When looking at a tree, Eloise is aware of some features
of her experience, specifically of the fact that her experience
represents something, and of the intentional content4 that
her experience represents (a tree). However, while looking at
a painting of a unicorn, “she can turn her attention to the
pattern of the paint on the canvas by virtue of which the
painting represents a unicorn. But in the case of her visual
experience of a tree, I want to say that she is not aware of, as
it were, the mental paint by virtue of which her experience
is an experience of seeing a tree” (667). In another example
Harman writes, “When one is looking at a red tomato and
one tries to turn one’s attention to the intrinsic features of
one’s experience, all that one will be able to do is focus more
on the object that is represented, that is, the tomato and the
redness of it.” Both of these points serve to clarify why it is
impossible, according to Gilbert Harman, to be aware of one’s

qualia (what he calls the “intrinsic features of experience”).
While Harman’s objection to the pro-qualia argument from
awareness may seem like a minor victory for intentionalism
(and by extension, functionalism), Ned Block attempts a
defense of its premise in his article, Mental Paint. Block is one
of the main proponents of phenomenism, and claims not only
that qualia, intrinsic properties of our experiences, exist, but
that there are some which represent intentional content, and
some which accompany it but represent nothing at all. He
calls the former sub-category of qualia “mental paint” and the
latter “mental oil” (Block 34).
Block argues that Harman is wrong about awareness,
though not about attention5. He argues that we can be aware

Harman invokes a very clear
example to support his case. He writes
that if you have a pain in your leg,
“It is very tempting to confuse features
of what you experience as happening in
your leg with the intrinsic features of
your experience. But the happening in
your leg that you are presented with is the
intentional object of your experience; it is
not the experience itself ” (668).
of qualia, even when we are not attending to them. Block
writes, “Another way to appreciate the point: stick your finger
in front of your face, then focus on something distant. It does
not seem so hard (at least to me) to attend to and be aware of
aspects of the experience of the finger as well as of the finger”
(7). However, this is a questionable appeal to intuition and
introspection. When we perform the above exercise, the way
the world is represented to us through perception changes,
and we are aware of this change. We also become aware of
(that is to say, attend to) certain features of our experience
because of this change. However, it does not follow that we
are aware of intrinsic features of our experience beyond those
that Eloise was aware of in her perception of the tree. If we do
become aware of some quale, then it is an indirect awareness
that comes from our discovery of two very different perceptual
experiences which represent the world differently to us.
However, it seems that for Block, the primary question is
ontological: is there mental paint? Block asks more specifically,
“is there anything mental in experience over and above its
representational content?” (Block 7). It seems Harman’s views
on the awareness issue are not inconsistent with the claim
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that mental paint might exist, only that we cannot be aware
of it. In other words, one can infer from Harman’s argument
that mental paint (if it exists) could never become part of our
intentional content. (Of course, we will see later that Harman
attempts to show two other arguments for the existence of
“mental paint” to be fallacious.) Block claims there is something
we can call mental paint and mental oil.

Can two people have the same
intentional content when looking at an
object, but have different phenomenal
characters in their respective experiences?
Block tells us one way to see if there is a real issue over
the existence of mental paint is to consider the inverted
spectrum scenario, which we will address later (8). Another
argument for qualia is the knowledge argument. It states that
“what it is like”6 to experience a quale (to see something red,
for instance) cannot be explained in purely functional terms
because a person blind from birth could know all the physical
and functional facts about color perception without knowing
what it is actually like to see red (Harman 664). Harman
attacks this argument by appealing to concepts. He claims
that the premise is false because knowing what it is like to
see something red requires your being able to represent red
to yourself by invoking a concept, R, which a person who has
never seen red before cannot have (Harman 671). Thus, the
argument is flawed because its only premise is false.
So far, this seems fairly straightforward. However, and
maybe you could have guessed, Block has an objection to
this kind of argument. He claims that the intentionalist (he
calls this the “representationist”) must appeal to color words
or “recognitional concepts” to make the above argument. In
other words, the concept above which we dubbed R is either
a color word (i.e. “red”) or a wordless concept which enables
one to recognize that (red) color. Block claims that this is a
problem because someone who grows up in a black and white
world and is never taught color words can recognize different
colors when he is exposed to them, presumably because he
has different phenomenal experiences of them. He claims that
the representationist has no internal difference to appeal to,
except one’s knowing color words or recognizing different
phenomenal characters (16-17). Here, we will delve into a
brief and relevant digression in order to voice an objection
to this argument — an objection which is consistent with
phenomenism.
Can two people have the same intentional content when
looking at an object, but have different phenomenal characters

in their respective experiences? For Block, there are two senses
of the phrase “looks the same” which need to be clarified.
In the first case, two people can look at the same object and
perceive the same color – that is, the object “looks the same”
to both of them because their experiences represent the object
as having a certain color. However, there is another sense in
which the phenomenal character of their experiences differs;
specifically, their phenomenal characters are inverted. To both
people, a given object (say, a ripe strawberry) appears red, but
for one person the experience feels the way it feels for the other
to look at the color of a jalapeno pepper. Here is the passage:
			
In what Shoemaker (1981) calls the intentional
			
sense of ‘looks the same’, the [aquamarine] chips
			
look the same (in respect of color) to Jack and Jill
			
just in case both of their perceptual experiences
			
represent it as having the same color. So I agree
			
with the objection that there is a sense of ‘looks
			
the same’ in which the aquamarine chip does
			
look the same to Jack and Jill. But where I disagree
			
with the objection is that I recognize another sense
			
of ‘looks the same’, (the qualitative or phenomenal
			
sense) a sense geared to phenomenal character,
			
in which we have reason to think that the 		
			
aquamarine chip does not look the same to
			
Jack as to Jill (Block 29).
Now that we recognize Block’s two meanings of the phrase
“looks the same,” we are in a position to argue against his
objection regarding color concepts. Surely, one can recognize
objects of different colors because they “look” different in
the first sense of the word, meaning that one’s experience
represents the objects as having certain respective colorsthis object appears red, that object appears blue. We do not
need the second sense of “looking” (that is, our feeling which is
accompanied by something appearing a certain way) in order
to distinguish between our experience of red and our experience of
blue. In other words, we do not need to talk of distinguishing
between our phenomenal experiences in order to talk of color
concepts, only of our perception of different colors. It seems
Block has undone his own argument by making a distinction
which is critical for phenomenism.
The final pro-qualia argument to be discussed here is
the inverted spectrum. According to this hypothesis, it is
metaphysically possible that two people could be functionally
alike in all ways, but things that look red to one person
look green to another, things that look yellow to one person
look blue to another, and so on. Since these people are
functionally alike but have different phenomenal experiences,
functionalism does not give a complete account of our mental
life (Harman 671). The inverted spectrum scenario is taken
to reference Block’s first meaning of “looking”, that is, colors
literally appearing inverted with respect to different people.
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The people who are inverted with respect to one another still
use colors words in the same way, so their spectrum inversion
is behaviorally undetectable.
There are some consequences that accompany the scenario
depicted above. First, let us note that, “in the case of normal
perception, there can be no distinction between how things
look and how they are believed to be” (Harman 672). Harman
points out that if two people are inverted with respect to each
other, they will have different beliefs about the color of any
given object. As a result, they must mean something different
by their color words. However, “According to functionalism,
if [two people] use words in the same way with respect to the
same things, then they mean the same things by those words
[. . .]. Some sort of philosophical argument is needed to argue
otherwise. No such argument has been provided by defenders
of the inverted spectrum” (673). This is an interesting and
controversial point. We will see how it resurfaces in the next
thought experiment.
There is another scenario related to the inverted spectrum
called Inverted Earth. In the latter case, the same person’s
phenomenal characters stay the same while the externalist
representational content changes7. Inverted Earth is a
place where “everything is the complementary color of the
corresponding earth object. The sky is yellow, the grass-like
stuff is red, etc. Second, people on Inverted Earth speak an
inverted language. They use ‘red’ to mean green, ‘blue’ to
mean yellow, and so forth” (Block 20). Additionally, if the
wires in your brain were switched around, you would notice
no difference upon your arrival on Inverted Earth. This is very
important, because when you arrive and look at the grass,
which is really red, and say something like, “What beautifully
green grass!” Here, Block claims that you are wrong; it is only
until you decide to adopt the language of Inverted Earth
that your color words represent your experiences correctly8.
According to Block,
			
“...after you have decided to adopt the concepts 		
			
and language of the Inverted Earth language
			
community and you have been there for 50 years,
			
your word ‘red’ and the representational content
			
of your experience as of red things (things that are
			
really red) will shift so that you represent them
			
correctly. Then, your words will mean the same as
			
those of the members of your adopted language
			
community and your visual experience will
			
represent colors veridically” (20).
This means that you will come to believe that ripe
tomatoes are green, that the sky is yellow, and so on. In Block’s
revised version of Inverted Earth, there are two consequences
of the Inverted Earth thought experiment. “The phenomenal
character of your color experience stays the same. That’s what
you say, and why shouldn’t we believe you? [. . .] But the

“According to functionalism, if
[two people] use words in the same way
with respect to the same things, then they
mean the same things by those words [. . .].
Some sort of philosophical argument
is needed to argue otherwise. No such
argument has been provided by defenders
of the inverted spectrum” (673).
representational content of your experience, being externalist,
shifts with external conditions in the environment” (21). This
argument has been the most difficult for the intentionalist to
topple. However, in his article, “Inverted Earth, Swampman,
and Representationism,” Michael Tye offers a fierce objection
to Block’s inverted earth argument. Tye defends an externalist
approach to memory and claims that the subject’s claim that
his or her phenomenal experience on Earth and Inverted
Earth are the same relies on an assumption about the accuracy
of memory which can legitimately be called into question. In
short, Tye claims that because we have good reason to doubt
our memories of phenomenal experience (party because
remembering is unlike looking at a photograph, where all the
represented content is shown accurately), the Inverted Earth
argument does not offer a serious objection to functionalism.
In fact, it cannot even show us that qualia (“mental paint”)
must exist.
By now, it should be evident that the phenomenist’s
only way to defend the existence of qualia rests on suspicious
assumptions about memory. Then again, one could attempt
a philosophical defense of why two people who are inverted
with respect to each other use the same color words, but mean
different things. However, it is doubtful that this argument
alone could warrant a theory about the phenomenal content
of consciousness.
1

In philosophy of mind, supervenience denotes a kind of dependency
relationship between mental and physical phenomena. According to
the supervenience thesis, there is an asymmetry between the mental
and the physical, which results from the fact that possession of the
former depends on possession of the latter. See Heil’s or Kim’s
Philosophy of Mind for further explanation.
2		Epiphenomenalism presents the view that the mental is only an
effect of physical underpinnings; while mental processes may seem
causally efficacious to us, they are in fact causally inert in every way
(Heil 185).
3
The issue of first person access originated long before the qualia
debate entered the scene of philosophy of mind. However, it is
particularly important here because in order to make a strong case
for qualia, one may need to invoke first person awareness of them.
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For instance, if I am experiencing something red, I must be aware of
the redness (the intentional content of my experience) and of the
way this content is represented to me. The question is, even if
the latter is possible, does it pose problems for functionalism? In
other words, is my awareness of the vehicle of representation
intentional or phenomenal?
What is intentional (or representational) content? In perception,
it is the way our world is represented to us. For instance, a ripe
strawberry is represented as of a certain hue, value, and intensity
(we generally just say it is represented as red). There are other forms
of intentional content, but they do not have to correspond to
something actual. For instance, I could have a hallucination of an
image or, like Ponce de Leon, search Florida for the Fountain of
Youth; in both cases, my intentional content does not refer to
something actually in the world (Harman 664).
Here, it is important to clarify the difference between awareness and
attention. Imagine having a conversation in your living room, when
you hear the air conditioning turn off in your house. When this
happens, you suddenly recognize that you were aware of the
humming sound produced by the system, the whole time although
you were not attending to it while you were talking with your friend.
Or, to use Block’s example: “For example, one might be involved
in intense conversation while a jackhammer outside causes one to
raise one’s voice without ever noticing or attending to the noise until
someone comments on it-at which time one realizes that one was
aware of it all along” (Block 7).
“What it is like” has become a common phrase which denotes
phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. It is borrowed
from Thomas Nagel’s influential article, “What Is It Like To Be a
Bat?”
Block discusses this scenario in some detail in his paper, “Mental
Paint,” although he also wrote an article called “Inverted Earth.”
Why does Block say that you are wrong in calling the grass green,
even though you experience it the same way you experienced grass on
the real Earth (because your “wires” are switched)? He claims that it
is for the same reason you are wrong to call Twin Earth water “water”
in Hilary Putnam’s famous thought experiment (Block 20).
For further reading on this issue, see Tye’s “Inverted Earth,
Swampman, and Representationism,” and specifically section II of
this article on Block’s assumptions regarding memory.
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